Rafael Muñoz Abad, a maritime analyst at the CISDE International Campus, writes for Splash today. In 1686, a certain Edward Lloyd—whom I imagine with a white beard and a navy wool coat with curved bone buttons—ran a coffeehouse on Tower Street, London, when he came up with the brilliant idea of publishing the status of the ships moored on the banks of the Thames, their latest voyages, any incidents they had encountered, and whether the shippers had made claims against the shipowner. All this was displayed on a blackboard in the finest tradition of British betting houses. This allowed shippers to ascertain the condition of the vessel with which they wished to sign a charter party. Several centuries later, the grandchildren of old Edward must be very grateful, as Lloyd’s went on to become one of the largest insurers and a benchmark in the maritime risk markets, as well as the most influential analysis and intelligence firm in the maritime business and one of the leading ship classification societies. Fear is the [invisible] force behind the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. This notorious bottleneck in maritime traffic requires ships to tack sharply to port to enter the Persian Gulf. In maritime terms, petrol prices at the pump and for the consumer do not rise simply because Iran has laid a minefield in the TSR (Traffic Separation Scheme), threatens to deploy drones against commercial shipping, or possesses a substantial arsenal of anti-ship missiles capable of striking within a mere 10 miles of the planet’s largest oil flow. Fear is the invisible barrier blocking the two maritime shipping lanes that account for 20% of global oil traffic. The fear of shipowners and fleet operators of losing their floating assets, their vessels. The lifeblood of the global economy. Then there is what is known as War Risk Insurance, or the maritime risk premium, which, broadly speaking, is essentially a clause separate from the general policy that the shipowner takes out with an insurer when their vessel is sailing in high-risk waters, and this includes a war scenario such as that in the Strait of Hormuz and its adjacent waters. There are two main types of maritime insurer. The most popular are the so-called P&I (Protection & Indemnity) Clubs. These are mutual societies where shipowners pay a premium to obtain cover for the hull, machinery, and a long list of other protections. These mutual societies are not-for-profit and may be reinsured by third-party insurers. The most renowned Clubs are The American Club, Britannia P&I, and The London P&I. As you can see, we are dealing with an Anglo-Saxon world, a living legacy of the United Kingdom’s former maritime dominance, which in some ways remains latent; if you doubt this, just ask the Spanish legal profession about the monumental farce they made of the hearing in which they claimed nearly a billion from the Prestige Club; but that is another story. The other model of marine insurance is the Lloyd’s insurance market, where risks are accepted in exchange for capital, and where a profit is indeed sought. Lloyd’s acts as a sort of barometer for the scale of marine policies. Furthermore, its marine bulletin serves as an informative benchmark for the industry. Following the US miscalculation in attacking Iran – the first and predictable consequence of which was to spread fear amongst shipowners – the risk premium soon began to rise and move away from its usual level. Let’s take a look. For a charter of an aframax ta