Read Seaways online at www.nautinst.org/seaways June 2023 | Seaways | 17 Providing learning through confidential reports – an international co-operative scheme for improving safety MARS – Lessons Learned MARS Report No 368 June 2023 Visit www.nautinst.org/MARS for online database MARS 202326 Collision – what collision? As edited from TAIIB (Latvia) report 1-2020  In daylight and good visibility, a 25 metre steel fishing vessel was engaged in fishing about 20nm offshore. With fishing gear set, it was making way at about two to three knots when the Master noticed a small cargo vessel approaching at about 13 knots and realised that a close quarters situation was developing. With the cargo vessel about 2nm away, the Master of the fishing vessel attempted to call the cargo vessel, but did not receive any answer. Soon, with the distance between the vessels decreasing and no response from the cargo vessel, the fishing Master realised he must take avoiding action. He put the helm hard to port and increased engine power to full ahead, even though this put the fishing gear at risk of damage. Nonetheless, the cargo vessel’s bow hit the aft superstructure of the fishing vessel, causing damage across an area of 1.5m 2 . The cargo vessel did not respond to further calls from the fishing vessel and kept its course and speed as if nothing had happened. The subsequent investigation by authorities found the following entry in the cargo vessel’s logbook; ‘small collision with fv’. Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) to inquire if another ferry, already in the port and due to depart, would in fact leave on the specified time. Port VTS responded that the ferry would depart in the next ten or 15 minutes and that it would be best if the approaching vessel held position outside the port until the outbound ferry left, given the constrained nature of the port. This information was given as a ‘suggestion’ and not as an instruction. About 18 minutes later, port VTS called the inbound ferry to advise that the outbound ferry was singling up and would be leaving in the next minute or two. This was acknowledged by the inbound ferry. However, instead of holding position, they continued inbound at a reduced speed of about six knots. On the departing ferry, the bridge team were not monitoring traffic prior to departure; instead, they relied on information from VTS regarding the position of the inbound vessel. The OOW stated that the ECDIS and radar were checked only after all lines were clear and they had lifted off the berth. They were surprised to see the inbound ferry, now very close, and only quick manoeuvres and last-minute communication between the vessels helped avoid collision. As it transpired, a relieving Master was bringing the inbound ferry into port as a training exercise under the supervision of the Master. Poor communication between the Master and the relieving Master contributed to the close quarters situation developing. Lessons learned l Never leave the scene of a collision until confirmation has been received from all concerned that everything is under control and pertinent information from both vessels has been exchanged. l While not specified in the official report, it can be assumed that the lone watch keeper on the cargo vessel was not keeping an effective lookout for other vessels. The course and speed of the cargo vessel never changed and the watch keeper never responded to the VHF calls from the fishing vessel. A power driven vessel underway must kee